JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The first conclusion is that new investment and its financing are crucial to economic recovery. Intersectoral adjustment of production in response to relative price changes cannot be accomplished by shifts in labour alone; it also requires capital investment. The second conclusion is that the Japanese government was important in coordinating investment in both periods, but in different ways. In the recovery phase, when investment was related to existing technology and coordination of the pecuniary externalities of investment was needed, polices such as directed credit and price controls were effective. In the transitional phase, when investment was related to new, imported technology, the industrial policy of coordinating strategic shifts in production technology was an effective method of intervention. The third conclusion is that stable corporate ownership and governance, and macroeconomic stability are crucial in the transitory and growth phases. This is because growth through imported technology depends upon learning, which requires long 
corporate time-horizons and effective mechanisms for risk-sharing. By contrast, reestablishment of production linkages through active investment during the recovery period can be pursued as a top priority without paying much attention to inflation and to corporate ownership and governance.
In effect, this paper shows early postwar Japan to be a case of gradual reform in the sense of a phased transition to a market economy. It is important to emphasize thatJapanese gradualism was not gradualism in the sense of the dual-track approach, where existing firms were left untouched and all additional national resources were used to create new firms. Japanese success came not just from new firms but also from the successful conversion of existing firms from military to civilian production.
The economic recovery phase, 1946-50

Low production and high inflation
In 1946, GNP was 70% of the prewar level and the price level was thirteen times higher than the previous year, see Table 2 .
The major reason for the decline in production was the complete destruction of intersectoral production linkages. The other major reason for the decline in production was the economic reforms aimed at the democratization of corporate ownership and control. The encouragement of labour activism resulted in extremely aggressive labour movements. The number of labour disputes soared from 256 in 1945 to 1,517 in 1948, and involved 52.8% of total employed labour. The dissolution of the zaibatsu created a sea of small stockholders, whose investment stakes were too small to cover the cost of extensive monitoring of corporate behaviour. Moreover, since 2,200 business leaders involved in the war effort were purged, some large firms were left with little management. The reasons for the high inflation were partly monetary and partly real. The money supply rose significantly immediately after the war because of belated payments to firms for wartime procurement and to soldiers on demobilization. This monetary expansion coming on top of the pent-up demand caused by wartime rationing caused the demand for the limited supply of consumer goods to rise sharply.
Policies1
The taming of inflation and the rehabilitation of production were achieved through two sets of micro supply-side measures. Macro demandside measures were used only at the conclusion of the anti-inflation fight. e ft pt of t s d h u T Reliance on micro supply-side measures was based on the recognition that the chief reason for inflation lay in the real economy, and that goods shortages were caused by inadequate inter-sectoral production linkages and bottlenecks. The first set of micro-based measures consisted of:
(a) the Priority Production System, introduced in mid-1947, to prevent bottlenecks by concentrating scarce materials, energy, and labour in key industries (the coal and steel industries were targeted initially, with fertilizers, electricity, and railway transport added later); (b) the rationing of strategic commodities; (c) the establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Bank to channel investment funds to priority industries; and (d) the compulsory rationing of 50 per cent of commercial banks' new funds to priority industries.
The second set of micro measures was the reintroduction of rationing and price controls in a new form in March 1946. Prices faced by purchasers were set at a fixed multiple of the prewar (1934-36) level. Since the multiplicand was the same for all basic goods, the controls implied an anchor to the 1934-36 price structure.2 Producer' prices were set to equal the total average cost of each good. Since production costs were usually higher than the purchaser's price, the difference was covered by government subsidies.
Because subsidies for price control caused budget deficits and because Reconstruction Finance Bank credits were financed by the issue of Bank ofJapan notes, these measures were in themselves inflationary. This is why orthodox stabilization, relying on tight monetary and fiscal policy, was introduced after March 1949. However, it must be noted that inflation had been falling well before the introduction of orthodox stabilization policy. The monthly rates of inflation had become less than 5% after mid-1948, probably reflecting the significant recovery of production during the year-see Table 3 . These points seem to justify skepticism about the necessity of austere orthodox macro policy after March 1949.
To see how much production and employment were affected by the new investments induced by the two sets of micro-based supply-side I I The production index for metal is a simple average of steel and nonferrous metals, and that for electricity and gas is a simple average of electricity and gas.
policies, Table 4 reports the ratio of bank borrowing of each manufacturing sector at the end of March 1949 to that in September 1947, and similar ratios for employment and output.3 Increases in bank borrowing are assumed to approximate new investment. Ratios normalized by dividing by the ratio of total industry are shown in columns (4) to (6). Column (6) shows that the normalized increase in production is high for the metal (1.19), machinery (1.22), and food (1.19). industries; and column (4) reveals that all three had above-average access to bank loans. But this evidence on credit access and production growth is only weakly convincing. Mining, ceramics and chemicals also had privileged access to bank loans but their output growth was just average. 
In case (I), x(t) and y(t) are InX(t) and InY(t), respectively, where Y(t) shows monthly index of industrial production and X(t) end-of-month value of total lending to industries by financial institutions. In case (II), x(t) = (X(t) -X(t -1))/X(t) and y(t) = (Y(t)-Y(t-1))/Y(t). In case (iii), x(t) = (X(t)-X(t-12))/X(t), and y(t) = (Y(t) -Y(t-12))/Y(t).
Table 5 seeks to test the effect of bank lending on employment and production by employing Granger causality tests. In two of the three specifications, I found one-way causality from bank borrowing to production. It seems fair to say that I found at least suggestive evidence of the efficacy of directed bank lending in affecting resource allocation. My conclusion from the 1946-50 experience is that shock therapy (orthodox stabilization policy) is impotent in coping with production declines even if it is quite effective in the fight against inflation.
The transition from recovery to growth: 1951-55
By the end of 1949, inflation was basically contained after production returned to 87% of the prewar normal level, the fiscal deficits were completely eliminated by the Balanced Budget Law of 1947, and (possibly also) after the implementation of austere stabilization policies in March 1949. This period deserves special emphasis as a phase of institutional preparation for the shift to a sustained growth path.
One institutional development was in the corporate governance and ownership system. The recovery process of Period I was plagued with serious instability in corporate control. Owing to a militant labour movement, the constant threat of takeover, and the purge of top managers, it is not an exaggeration to say that new top managers, mostly young factory managers, lacked confidence in their capabilities. However, things changed in Period II.
First, as the Cold War intensified, the focus of occupation policy changed from demilitiarization of Japan to strengthening Japan as an anti-communist stronghold. As a result, managers began to lobby strongly through the Keidanren (The Federation of Corporate Managers) first, to reduce labour's influence by revising the labour laws and, second, to mitigate the restrictions in the 1947 Fair Trading Act on the holding of stock by corporate firms and financial institutions. Their lobbying succeeded on both fronts.
With the revision of the Fair Trading Act and the concomitant easing of the prohibition of shareholding by ex-zaibatsu firms and families, the postwar business group system -keiretsu or main bank system -gradually formed. Through long-term relationships with commercial banks, and through the newly established long-term credit banks, corporate managers secured access to long-term investment funds without resorting to capital markets with high agency cost (see Teranishi, 1993c ).4
The Fair Trading Act was also revised to allow legalized cartels to control production in case of severe depression, and to enable concerted technology deepening by particular industries. There is no doubt that these cartels are detrimental to market competitiveness, but they may have succeeded in inducing corporate managers to invest competitively in new technologies.
These legal changes strengthened the autonomy of corporate managers considerably. While it is not certain how this autonomy is related to the optimal pattern of corporate governance from the perspective of consumer welfare, there is no doubt that managers have steered the corporate sector with a firm grip toward a growth-oriented strategy.
Another important institutional and organizational shift which lay the foundation for growth occurred in government policy. Measures to encourage investment in new technology were introduced. First, a tax and
The importance of long-term funds to investment decision-making is emphasized by Mayer (1988) . 4 The importance of long-term funds to investment decision-making is emphasized by Mayer (1988) . subsidy system providing incentives for capital deepening and technology imports was adopted. Second, a directed credit system of government financial institutions, financed mainly by postal savings, was established. One of these, the Japan Development Bank, was established in 1951 to pick 'winners' and 'losers'.5
While these policies were concerned with the technological externalities of investment by subsidizing firms which introduced new technology, another policy tool newly adopted during Period II, economic planning, targeted the pecuniary externalities of investment. The first postwar economic plan, the Five Year Plan for Economic Self-Support (Keizai Jiritsu GokanenKeikaku), was introduced in 1955. While the plan was only indicative and lacked compulsory power, it has been said that it was quite effective at sharing information and building up consensus (see Komine, 1993) , and resulted in adjustments of dynamic growth patterns of sectoral demand.
It would be pertinent here to comment on the long-run effects of postwar reforms. Although we have emphasized only the negative shortrun effects of reforms so far, their strong positive effects in the long run should not be neglected. The first effect is on social stability. The land and labour reforms opened the chance of participation and sharing in the growth process for small farmers and workers, with consequent reduction of the social conflicts which had seriously plagued interwar economic society.
The second effect is on economic efficiency. For example, while land reform did not cause any immediate changes in productivity (Kawagoe, 1993) , it seems undeniable that farmers who obtained land became more active in introducing new technology based on mechanization and chemical inputs in later years, when they came to feel secure with respect to land holding. It is also often emphasized that the trust-busting policies significantly enhanced competitive behaviour among business groups as well as among individual firms (Yonekura, 1993) .
Gradualism in the Japanese context and economic reform in EEISU: concluding remarks
The experience of the Japanese economy after WWII is a case of gradual economic reforms in three senses: (i) an emphasis on the role of new investment in the adjustment of sectoral production; (ii) a gradual approach to the establishment of macroeconomic stability and a stable corporate control system; and (iii) stepwise implementation of different policy measures for recovery and subsequent growth.
Specifically, during the recovery phase when the primary task was to convert from a wartime economy, the reallocation of labour among various sectors was facilitated by the state's ample supply of investment funds for the repair and conversion of productive equipment. In the transitional period, the two primary policy tasks were the establishment of stable corporate governance and the provision of incentives to Japanese firms to import foreign technology. It seems that technology import was also helped by the availability of trained workers with firm-specific skills. These workers were retained in the firms partly because of severe opposition to lay-offs in the labour movement and partly because of the price control system which subsidized the wage costs of a temporarily idle labour force.
It must be noted, however, that Japan's transition from a wartime controlled economy to a market economy was rather simple compared with the transition of EEFSU from a socialist economic system. Three important differences must be noted: (i) Since Japan retained the capitalist system during wartime, privatization was not an important issue in postwar reform in Japan.6 (ii) It must be noted that Japan already had well-developed capitalist institutions (like financial markets and a tax system), so there was no need for Japan to build new capitalist institutions in order to shift to a market-based system.7 (iii) It is also worth emphasizing thatJapan's experience of a controlled economy lasted only 9 years, from 1937 to 1945, and so there was no need for the Japanese to learn how to use the market mechanism.
Despite the preceding caveats, I draw three implications from Japan's experience with regard to economic reform in EEFSU. First, it seems that although well-defined and stable corporate governance structures are indispensable for growth with imported technology (and probably also for growth based on the mobilization of non-industrial labour), they are not strictly necessary for the recovery from a decline in production. Japan in Period I achieved production recovery despite a seriously confused corporate governance structure. The current policy of rapid privatization in some of the former socialist economies should therefore be reconsidered on the basis of this point.
Second, the Japanese experience seems to support a case for using micro-based supply-side policies to deal with declines in production. It seems reasonable to say that in situations where existing capital equipment cannot be used without repair, conversion, or replacement, the reallocation of labour in response to relative price signals will not be effective unless accompanied by new investment in equipment. Shock therapy's implicit assumption of autonomous economic recovery with smooth allocation of resources is inadequate in this case. It follows that if the situation of EEFSU is similar to Japan, the appropriate policy is not shock therapy but emphasis on the supply side of the economy, especially on financing enterprise investment.
However, the situation of EEFSU may not necessarily be similar to Japan. The policy of rationing credit and supplying subsidies is liable to encourage soft budget behaviour and unproductive rent-seeking activities by entrepreneurs. This distortion occurred in Japan to some extent. For example, there is evidence that subsidies provided an incentive for coal mining companies to deliberately work inferior mines, leaving the more efficient mines for future exploitation. In the case of EEFSU, this kind of inefficiency could become a more wide-spread phenomenon. However, it seems that this type of government failure could be reduced by a proper method of policy implementation. In Japan, most subsidy policies were introduced with implicit or explicit time limits. Under this scheme, entrepreneurs were forced to prepare hard for the time when subsidies would be eliminated.
A final, but most important, issue is how to put a depressed economy on a trajectory of sustained growth. In this regard, the difference between recovery from production decline and growth is fundamental. When an economy is suffering from production decline due to the destruction of intersectoral production linkages, the proper policy is intervention in the pecuniary externalities of investment. As shown by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), a concerted surge of investment in various sectors is needed to secure adequate markets for the products of investing firms in order for the economy to avoid a low level equilibrium trap.
Learning is not needed during the recovery phase. However, in the subsequent growth phase, learning and formation of learning capabilities seem to be essential.8 At that point, government policy should be concerned not only with the pecuniary externalities of investment, but also with technological externalities as well (see Romer, 1986, and Lucas, 1988) . In order to benefit from the fruits of learning external to the individual firm, government subsidies are necessary to encourage technology imports. At the same time, firms must have long time horizons because learning and the formation of learning capability is a time-consuming process. This is why macroeconomic stability and stable corporate governance structure are indispensable to the growth phase.
In the context of the dichotomy between gradualism and shock therapy (defined as once-and-for-all liberalization of prices and privatization of firms combined with tight monetary and fiscal policy), I am contending the inappropriateness of shock therapy to the economic reform ofJapan. Unlike shock therapy, where existing firms are forced to dissolve and workers are obliged to find job in new firms, Japan's gradual approach emphasized the adjustment of the existing firms to the new circumstances. The important policy finding here is that the reallocation of labour across sectors was greatly facilitated by the government's supply of investment funds and subsidies.
Discussion
Jeffrey Sachs
Harvard University Professor Teranishi offers some important insights into Japan's postwar recovery and rapid economic growth. He distinguishes between the shortterm recovery of war-damaged industry, and more fundamental reforms that supported long-term economic growth. This distinction is important if we are to understand the lessons for Ukraine that may be found in Japan's experience.
Let us start with Japan's fundamental reforms, since these provided the base for Japan's remarkable economic performance during the entire post-war era. I would stress the following reforms, which are also mentioned by Professor Teranishi: privately-owned enterprises rather than state enterprises; (6) Macroeconomic stability: after 1949, the Japanese economy operated with a low budget deficit, low inflation, and a unified, stable nominal exchange rate; (7) Industrial policy: government industrial targets were indicative rather than compulsory, and served mainly to share information and build an understanding among industrial groups about future trends in technology and market demand.
It is obvious that this list of fundamental reforms raises many important issues for Ukraine's own economic strategy. Ukraine, like Japan, must shift from an economy heavily directed to the military-industrial complex, to a civilian-oriented economy. Ukraine also needs land reform, not to break up large private farms, as was the case in Japan, but to break up large collective and state farms. Similarly, Ukraine must act to foster strong copmetition in the domestic market, partly through free international trade and partly by breaking up long-standing industrial monopolies.
Ukraine will also need a flexible labour market, since like Japan, Ukraine must undertake an enormous reallocation of labour. While Japan's growth was fueled by surplus labour in agriculture, much of Ukraine's recovery will be fueled by surplus labour in state industry, which will move to private industry and to services. Ukraine, like post-warJapan, must also promote private ownership, if it is to have a chance to develop a dynamic industrial response as in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. Ukraine also requires the macroeconomic stability that Teranishi rightly stresses was a precondition for Japan's sustained rapid growth.
Finally, Ukraine can perhaps benefit as well from some of the lessons of indicative (not compulsory) planning, which helped to make Japanese enterprises more aware of international technologies and market opportunities. Of course, in Ukraine, the state bureaucracy is much less equipped than Japan's to assist firms in these areas. Ukraine's firms will tend to learn more about the world market not through its bureaucracy, but through the presence of multinational firms, which will bring technology, market access, and new organizational ideas to Ukraine.
If we look to the specifics of Japan's industrial recovery policies during 1946-49 (the period that Professor Teranishi calls 'Phase I'), the lessons for Ukraine are less direct or relevant. In fact, the Japanese experience might even prove misleading. Professor Teranishi stresses, at length, that the Japanese government used a kind of crude planning system (the Priority Production System) to stimulate industrial recovery in the first years of the economic reform. Professor Teranishi cautiously hints that such a system might be relevant for Ukraine. I doubt that there is much relevance, however. Japan's initial conditions in 1946 were very different from Ukraine's conditions in 1994.
As Professor Teranishi describes, Japan suffered from: (1) extensive war damage to basic industries; (2) sharp bottlenecks in scarce inputs, because of complete control of Japanese trade by the US military occupation authorities; (3) a crisis in domestic production caused by a sudden shortage of coal miners, as Korean and Chinese forced labourers left the coal mines at the end of World War II to return home; and (4) a shortage of capacity caused by the wartime conversion of some civilian industries to military use. The combined effect of these factors was to leave Japanese industrial production at just 20 percent of the pre-war level.
In these circumstances, the Japanese government was able to target a small number of basic industries in 1946-48 (mainly steel and coal) to overcome these production bottlenecks. As summarized by Yoshikawa and Okazaki (in Teranishi and Kosai, 1993, p. 97):
'The primary purpose of the policy was to input as much steel as possible in to the coal mines and then, in return, send coal back to the steel industry to make a kind of virtuous cycle between two industries. Because the Japanese economy faced at that time a serious shortage of raw materials, this policy was essentially an attempt to substitute domestic production of coal for interrupted imports, and made sense, at least in theory. How successful the policy actually was still remains a controversy today.'
The main reason that targeting was possible at all was that the production bottlenecks could be identified in a couple of basic industries, mainly coal and steel.
This description of the problem shows how different is the challenge faced by Ukraine, even in the short term. Ukraine, and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, do not face simple 'supply Juro Teranishi bottlenecks', but rather deep misallocations and waste of resources. Unlike Japan in 1946, Ukraine's problem is not industrial resources. Unlike Japan in 1946, Ukraine's problem is not to increase steel production; already, Ukraine is unable to sell all the steel it could produce! The traditional heavy industries in Ukraine -coal, steel and chemicals -have a crisis of overcapacity, not supply bottlenecks. Ukraine's economy was heavily distorted for decades, to spur production of heavy industry, mainly for the Soviet military-industrial complex, rather than consumer goods and services, and industrial exports. Now, the need is to cut back heavy industrial output, and to aim much more for light industry (e.g. food processing), consumer goods, and services.
The market place will be the most effective means for deciding which of the old industries should decline, and by how much, and which new industries have the best chances of success. In Japan in the 1950s, it was Sony, rather than the Japanese government, which foresawJapan's future in consumer electronics. Similarly, in Ukraine, it will almost surely be individual entrepreneurs and foreign investors who will spot the viable opportunities for Ukraine, rather than the state bureaucracy. Investment subsidies and targeted credits made some sense in Japan in the late 1940s when the government knew that the goal was to promote the steel and coal sectors (or even fertilizers, electricity, and rail transport).
In Ukraine, by contrast, it is much easier to judge which sectors should decline rather than which ones should grow! To a very great extent, markets rather than bureaucrats will have to give the answer. This is especially true once we recognize that politicians have a strong bias towards protecting old sectors (the 'status quo') rather than spurring on new ones. Professors Raquel Fernandez and Dani Rodrik (1991) have recently explored some conceptual reasons why this kind of status quo bias occurs in a democracy.
Professor Teranishi is a bit too quick in his judgement that 'shock therapy' (or orthodox stabilization policy) is impotent in coping with production declines even if it is quite effective in the fight against inflation.' In fact Poland, which first introduced shock therapy in 1990, has been growing since 1992, and in 1993 was the fastest growing country in all Europe (see Sachs, 1993 , for a survey of Poland's reforms and the early reform results). Poland's GDP growth will be even faster in 1994 than in 1993. We have seen in Poland the emergence of around a million new businesses since the start of the reforms at the start of 1990. The process of transformation proceeds rapidly, and was given an important boost by the 'shock therapy' measures. We could expect to see the rapid emergence of a dynamic private sector in Ukraine as well, once macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and legal reform in the commercial sphere are brought to fruition.
